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Children’s Reasoning With Peers and Parents About Moral Dilemmas

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CITATION

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Children encounter moral norms in several different social contexts. Often it is in hierarchically structured interactions with parents or other adults, but sometimes it is in more symmetrically structured interactions with peers. Our question was whether children’s discussions of moral norms differ in these two contexts. Consequently, we had 4- and 6-year-old children (N = 72) reason about moral dilemmas with their mothers or peers. Both age groups opposed their partner’s views and explicitly justified their own views more often with peers than with mothers. Mothers adapted their discussions to the cognitive levels of their children (e.g., focused more on the abstract moral norms with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children), but almost always with a pedagogical intent. Our results suggest that with mothers, moral judgments are experienced mostly as non-negotiable dictums, but with coequal peers they are experienced more as personal beliefs that can be actively negotiated.

Keywords: moral development, moral reasoning, two social worlds

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To navigate their social world, children have to learn the norms that govern their social groups. Piaget (1932) proposed two fundamentally different but equally important contexts in which moral development takes place: children’s interactions with their adult caregivers and with their same-age peers. In adult–child interactions, due to the hierarchical structure of the relationship, the child often acts as the recipient of knowledge: The adult provides the child with knowledge of social and moral norms, and the child often accepts this without questioning. In peer interactions, however, both participants are often equally knowledgeable and have equally valid perspectives, so which perspective is better must be negotiated. Thus, in their interactions with adults, children usually tend to conform, whereas in peer interactions there is more joint decision making guided by cooperative reasoning (Tomasello, 2019).

Research has shown that starting around 14 months, children usually recognize adults as more reliable information sources than children (Rakoczy, Hamam, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010; Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2012). Children often learn about the moral norms of their social groups from their parents, who respond to moral transgressions by their children through explaining the reasons for rules and the consequences of their transgressions (Chapman & Zahn-Waxler, 1982; see also Smetana, 1999 for a review). Walker and Taylor (1991) found a correlation between the complexity of parents’ explanations and their children’s level of moral understanding; for example, the parents whose children had low scores in moral reasoning tasks, provided simpler explanations than the parents whose children had high scores in these tasks.

On the other hand, peer interactions, as argued by Piaget (1932), offer children a “safe haven” to explore the moral norms of their social groups. To resolve their peer conflicts, children refer to norms of property entitlements or possessions and fairness (turn-taking), highlighting the “equal footing” between the participants (Ingram & Bering, 2010; Shantz, 1987). Recent studies have shown that preschoolers create and enforce social norms in their peer interactions (Göckeritz, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014; Köymen, Lieven, et al., 2014; Köymen, Schmidt, Rost, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2015). A recent study by Mammen, Köymen, and Tomasello (2018) also showed that preschoolers can reason with their peers about third-party moral transgressions and adjust the informativeness of their explanations for their moral judgments based on their mutual knowledge about social norms. For instance, when justifying their judgment of punishing a person who violated an unfamiliar social norm, they produced informative justifications, explaining the general norm (e.g., “because in Mia’s kin-
dergarten, you must not put yellow cars in the green box, but only in the yellow one”, p. 256). However, when justifying their judgment for punishing a person who violated a familiar moral norm, they simply referred to the fact or the act itself (e.g., “because she stole”), seeing no need to state the general norm involved (e.g., “One must not steal”) as moral norms are known to almost everyone. Moreover, some intervention studies have shown that children’s individual scores on moral reasoning tasks significantly improved after having a discussion with peers (Damon & Killen, 1982; Kruger, 1992).

Despite the importance of these two contexts, there is no systematic comparison of moral reasoning of children with their peers and their caregivers, with one exception. Kruger and Tomasello (1986) found that in their discussions with mothers, both 7- and 11-year-old girls followed the mother’s lead and mostly explained their views after being asked; whereas in their discussions with peers, children more often used transforming statements (“transforms”) which were defined as commenting on their partners’ statements, challenging their partners’ views and asking for feedback. However, their analyses did not necessarily focus on the content of children’s justifications or how they actually talked about social norms (e.g., general norms vs. facts), how the moral dilemmas were treated and resolved, or whether mothers acted differently depending on the age of their children. Analyzing these would provide a better picture of children’s experience in the two contexts of mother–child and peer interactions. Moreover, Kruger and Tomasello (1986) analyzed the discussions by school-age children. Yet, studies show that already at preschool age, children are able to reason about third-party moral transgressions with adults (Mulvey, 2016) and peers (Mammen et al., 2018). Finally, Kruger and Tomasello (1986) predicted that the hierarchy between the children and the mothers would be stronger with younger children, but they did not find an age difference. This lack of age difference could be explained by the ceiling effect (the children were too old).

In the current study, therefore, we investigated how younger children, 4- and 6-year-old children, reasoned about moral dilemmas with their peers and their mothers. We selected these age groups because children are observed to justify their moral judgments about third-party moral transgressions in their spontaneous peer conversations around age 3 or 4 (Ingram & Bering, 2010; Mammen et al., 2018). We presented the (mother–child or peer) dyads with moral dilemmas, in which two characters could help a child at the expense of breaking a promise. One of the two characters kept the promise and thus could not help the child. The other character helped the child and thus could not keep the promise. The dyads were asked to decide which character did the right thing by distributing five gemstones between the two characters. We picked these dilemmas because findings suggest that preschoolers are aware of the moral norms of keeping a promise (e.g., Kannagiesser, Köymen, & Tomasello, 2017) and of helping or cooperating (e.g., McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015). We had two sets of research questions.

1. Do 4- and 6-year-old children reason differently with their peers and with their mothers? We predicted that children would produce justifications spontaneously and justify their disagreements with the partner’s view more often with their peers than with their mothers, as observed with older children. We also predicted 6-year-old children to be more active with their mothers than 4-year-old children because the hierarchy between mothers and children might get weaker as children get older (Kruger & Tomasello, 1986).

We further predicted that in their discussions of moral dilemmas, 4-year-old children would focus on the facts in the stories (e.g., “she helped” or “she kept her promise”), whereas 6-year-old children might discuss general moral norms (e.g., by stating the norm “one should always help”) due to their more advanced sociocognitive and linguistic skills (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children might focus more on abstract general norms with mothers than with their peers because the mothers reminding them of the social norms.

2. Do mothers reason differently with their 4- and 6-year-old children? We predicted that mothers would adopt their reasoning to their children’s knowledge of moral norms (Walker & Taylor, 1991), simplify the stories and focus on facts, such as who did the right thing (i.e., “She broke her promise but she helped”) with the 4-year-old children, whereas they would discuss the moral norms generally and treat the stories as dilemmas with 6-year-old children (i.e., “Helping is important but keeping promises is important, too”).

Method

Participants

The participants were 4-year-old children (N = 36; M_age = 4 years, 8 months, range = 4 years, 6 months–4 years, 11 months; 18 girls), 6-year-old children (N = 36; M_age = 6 years, 8 months, range = 6 years, 6 months–6 years, 11 months; 18 girls), and mothers (N = 24, M_age = 36 years, 4 months, range = 22 years, 7 months–48 years, 2 months). We used a 2 × 2 between subjects design: age (4 years vs. 6 years) and condition (peer vs. mother–child). There were 12 same-sex peer dyads and 12 mother–child dyads per age group, resulting in a total of 24 peer dyads and 24 mother–child dyads. The peer dyads were formed based on the teachers’ recommendation of frequent play partners. We only tested mothers to avoid confounds due to gender match of the parent and the child. The sample size was determined prior to data collection and was based on previous studies with similar designs (Köymen et al., 2014, 2015; Kruger & Tomasello, 1986). Moreover, to increase the statistical power, each dyad went through three trials, so we had three observations from each dyad. We did not run a power analysis prior to data collection. We decided against running a post hoc power analysis based on our observed effects, as this would potentially overestimate our power (see Yuan & Maxwell, 2005). Instead, we calculated power by simulating data based on our experimental design (sample size and number of observations per participant) and assuming a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = .50). For the analyses on children’s justifications, repeated simulations with a logistic regression with random intercepts for participants and stories revealed a power of 0.71 and 0.73 for condition and age groups, respectively. For the analyses on mothers’ justifications, the simulations revealed a power of 0.87 for age groups. Although our sample is slightly underpowered, 48 dyads was the biggest feasible sample size due to practical constraints. The peer dyads were tested in 10 nurseries, the mother–child dyads in six nurseries, all in different neighborhoods of a midsize city in Germany. The nurseries were selected randomly.
All participants were fluent German speakers and had different socioeconomic backgrounds.

Materials

In the first warm-up, the dyads were presented with a toy cat and three envelopes containing two pictures each: a ball of wool and a bouquet of flowers as gifts for the cat, fish and a lollipop as food items for the cat, a dog and a mouse as friends for the cat. In the second warm-up, the dyads were presented with three sets of hand-drawn pictures of two children and had to distribute five gemstones between the two characters.

In the three experimental trials, we used three hand-drawn five-page picture books, each of which depicted a moral dilemma. In the filler trial, a fourth picture book was used which depicted a moral transgression (not a dilemma). There were two versions of each book: one with girls and one with boys, to match the gender of the children (see Appendix A for the pictures).

Procedure

The procedure of this study was approved by the Child Subjects Committee of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (Project code: ReasAP, Project title: “The two normative worlds”). All sessions were videotaped. For familiarization, all children first played a jigsaw with the experimenter (E), whilst the mothers filled out the consent forms in the mother-child condition.

There were two sets of warm-up trials. All warm-up sessions were conducted as interactive discussions between E and the dyads to show the dyads how the game should be played. In all warm-up trials, E facilitated the decision making and made sure all dyads solved the task the same way. The first warm-up was introduced to encourage the dyads to provide justifications for their choices. E said that they will plan a birthday party for the toy cat Mimi. Then, E presented the three envelopes, stating the following:

For her birthday party, we choose a gift [from the envelope with wool and flowers], something to eat [from the envelope with fish and a lollipop], and somebody to invite to the party [from the envelope with a dog and a mouse]. In each of these envelopes, there are two items. You two will decide together, which of these two items Mimi likes.

E elicits reasons from them by asking why. E always stated the reasons:

I say, she gets the ball of wool, because cats like to play with it and cats can’t really use flowers; I say, she gets fish, because cats like fish and lollipops are for humans; I say, we invite the dog, because dogs and cats can get along sometimes, but the mouse might be eaten by the cat.

After hearing these reasons, all dyads agreed with E and made the same right decisions. E then praised the dyads for choosing the right items.

The second warm-up consisted of three trials that reminded dyads about the moral norms of helping and keeping promises and involved distributing five gemstones. In the first warm-up trial, E introduced the drawings of two children: one who helped cleaning up their toys, the other who did not help. E then asked, “Who did the right thing?”, “How many gemstones should they get? Why?” E always concluded, “I say, she does not deserve any gemstones, because she did not help, but he helped, so we can give him all five”, to which all dyads agreed. In the second warm-up trial, E introduced the drawings of two children who promised to share their crayons with a third child. One of them kept the promise; the other did not. Again, E led the decision toward a 0/5 distribution favoring the promise-keeper (e.g., “Because she kept her promise and he did not”), to which all dyads agreed. Unlike other warm-up trials in which one character did the right thing and the other did the wrong thing, in the third warm-up trial, the dyads were introduced to a dilemma, that is, that a character can do something right and something wrong at the same time and how the distribution of the gemstones can reflect this dilemma. To avoid priming children in how to resolve moral dilemmas, we chose conventional transgressions. E presented two drawings of children: “Else washed her hands and then she ate this sweet cake right before lunch”; “Moritz did wash his hands and then ate this healthy sandwich for lunch.” This time, E led the decision toward a 2/3 distribution, always ending with “Moritz did not wash his hands, so he cannot have all the gemstones. But he ate a healthy sandwich, so we can give him some gemstones. Else, she washed her hands, so she can also have some gemstones, but she ate sweets right before lunch, so we cannot give her all the gemstones.” It was up to the dyads to decide which character should get three gemstones. In this last warm-up trial, children were only praised for settling on the 2/3 distribution and not about whom they favored. E ensured that the dyads solved all warm-up tasks in the same correct way. In the first five warm-up trials, there was a clearly better option. Not correcting some dyads making an incorrect decision might have primed these dyads to think that whatever they decide would be fine later on. Eventually, these dyads might have been less likely to talk or justify their decisions.

In the three experimental trials, E presented the three stories with moral dilemmas (See-saw story, Lego house story, and Building blocks story; see Appendix A for the exact narration for each story in English). For example, in the see-saw story, on page 1, two characters were introduced. On page 2, the two characters made a promise (e.g., “They promise each other to stay on the see-saw until lunch”). On page 3, a third needy character was introduced, turning the situation into a dilemma for the other two characters (e.g., “This is Max, he likes the swings. But he is not good at it, so he asks the others to give him a push”). On page 4, one character (the promise-keeper) decides to keep his promise instead of helping the needy character, who is then sad. On page 5, the other character (the helper) decides to help the needy character instead of keeping his promise. As a result, the promise-keeper is sad. E always presented the promise-keeper first because if the character that broke the promise was presented first, it would not be logical for the other character to keep a promise that is already broken. We chose these moral dilemmas for four reasons: (a) We wanted to contrast two moral transgressions with comparable seriousness so that dyads treat the stories as moral dilemmas; (b) we contrasted keeping promises and helping because they are both positive moral duties (“one should help,” as opposed to negative duties, such as “one should not steal”); (c) we wanted to avoid participants justifying or excusing serious moral transgressions (e.g., “It might be ok to steal if . . .”). (d) As stated earlier, the literature suggest that preschoolers are aware of the moral norms of keeping promises (e.g., Kamngiesser et al., 2017) and helping others (e.g., McAuliffe et al., 2015).
After the dilemmas, E first presented a drawing of the promise-keeper and then the drawing of the helper and repeated what each character did (e.g., “She kept her promise, but she did not help. She did not keep her promise, but she helped”). Then, E gave five gemstones to the dyads to distribute between the two characters. We asked the dyads to distribute an odd, rather than an even number of gemstones, so that they were forced to favor one character over the other. Because both characters were portrayed as equally good and bad, it was difficult to decide who did the right thing so the dyads would engage in longer discussions. E said, “Now you two can decide together who did the right thing and explain to each other why. You can distribute the gemstones as you like.” To reduce the memory load, the picture books remained on the table while the dyads made their decision. E then left the room and only entered when the dyads made their decisions or got distracted. The dyads did not receive any feedback on their decisions at the end of the trials. This procedure was repeated for two more experimental trials with similar dilemmas about helping and keeping a promise (see Appendix A). After the first experimental trial, there was a filler trial, which followed the same procedure as the experimental trials, except that the story was not a dilemma but a simple transgression. A neutral character lent a toy to each of two characters. One character returned the toy and the other did not. This filler trial was introduced to prevent mothers from predicting that the next story might be a similar dilemma. The order of the stories in the experimental trials and the presentation order of the actions were counterbalanced. That is, all children heard about the promise-keeper first in the story, but at the end of the story when children were reminded of each character’s action, half of the children heard, “She didn’t help, but she kept her promise,” the other half heard, “She kept her promise, but she didn’t help” to avoid any biases toward the first or the last clause.

Coding

The dyads’ discussions during the experimental trials were transcribed. We coded for two features of joint decisions: (a) how dyads justified their decisions/proposals and (b) how dyads distributed the gemstones.

After we identified the justifications, we modified the coding scheme of Kruger and Tomasello (1986), who used a general term “transact,” and coded each justification for its (a) spontaneity, (b) disagreement, and (c) content. All three aspects were coded independently from each other (i.e., all justifications were coded for spontaneity and disagreement regardless of their content). For spontaneity, we identified whether a justification was elicited by a question from the partner or produced spontaneously. For disagreement, we identified challenges: All justifications that were produced in disagreement with the partner’s previous proposals or justifications about the distribution of the gemstones (e.g., after the partner proposed to give the promise-keeper more gemstones, saying, “But she [the promise-keeper] didn’t help”). For the content of the justifications, we used a coding scheme similar to that of Mammen et al. (2018) as this study also investigated how children justified their moral judgments. This coding scheme differentiated among the following three types:

- General norms: Justifications referring to the norms (e.g., “Helping is important”) or evaluating the action (e.g., “She helped, that is nicer”)
- Facts: Justifications describing the action of the characters (e.g., “She did not help/keep her promise”)
- Irrelevant: Justifications unrelated to the story (e.g., “Because I want to”)

For each trial, we coded how the dyads resolved the dilemma in terms of how they distributed the gemstones. Further, we coded if the dyads came up with alternative endings to the story. Although the task was to decide on who did the right thing, some dyads suggested that a character could technically have done both (e.g., “She could come back and keep her promise after helping her”), which went out of the script of the story. We termed this alternative ending. This category was not part of our initial coding. We observed this in mothers’ utterances and added this to our coding scheme.

A second coder, who was blind to conditions and hypotheses, coded 25% of the transcripts, three dyads from each age group and condition, for identifying the justifications, justification spontaneity, challenges, justification content and trials with alternative endings. The agreements were as follows: $\kappa = .80, \kappa = .80, \kappa = .82, \kappa = .87$, and $\kappa = .87$, respectively.

Results

The length of the discussions varied across the conditions: Peer discussions were shorter than the discussions between children and their mothers. In the peer condition, 4-year-old children’s discussions across the three experimental trials contained seven to 54 on-task utterances ($M = 24.2, SD = 13.8$), 6-year-old children’s discussions contained three to 31 on-task utterances ($M = 19.7, SD = 8.9$). In the mother–child condition, discussions with 4-year-old children contained 31 to 153 on-task utterances ($M = 84.3; SD = 37.4$), discussions with 6-year-old children contained 26 to 146 on-task utterances ($M = 79.8, SD = 42.1$).

Preliminary Analyses: Gemstone Distribution

Mother–child dyads with 4-year-old children distributed the gemstones reflecting a dilemma (i.e., 2/3 distribution) in 18 out of 36 trials (50%), mother–child dyads with 6-year-old children in 28 out of 36 trials (78%) so mothers treated the stories as dilemmas more often with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children. That is, mothers with 6-year-old children rarely favored one character by choosing a 4/1 or 5/0 distribution. Peer dyads of both ages preferred each option equally. Four-year-old peer dyads chose the 2/3 distribution in 22 trials (61%), and 6-year-old peer dyads chose the 2/3 distribution in 19 trials (53%; see Figure 1).

Mother–child dyads with 6-year-old children favored the helper and gave her/him three or more gemstones in 27 of 36 trials (75%). Mother–child dyads with 4-year-old children favored the helper in 20 of the 36 trials (56%). In the peer condition, each age group favored the helper in 19 of the 36 trials (53%). We ran a $2 \times 2$ between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) to see whether dyads’ preference for one character over the other changed across the two conditions and the two age groups. The response variable
was the number of trials (out of 3) in which dyads favored the helper or awarded the helper three or more gemstones. There was no significant difference between the two age groups, \( F(1, 44) = 0.89, p = .35, \eta^2 = .02, \) or between the two conditions, \( F(1, 44) = 1.46, p = .23, \eta^2 = .03, \) on the number of trials in which dyads favored the helper. The interaction between age and condition was not significant either, \( F(1, 44) = .89, p = .35, \eta^2 = .02; \) see Figure 2. The findings that there was no significant age or condition difference in dyads’ preference for the characters and that the dyads favored each character around 50% of the time suggest that the dyads treated the stories as dilemmas.

In the filler trial, in each age group 11 of the 12 mother–child dyads chose the 5/0 distribution in the filler trial and one dyad chose the 4/1 distribution, punishing the transgressor. The majority of the 4-year-old peer dyads also punished the transgressor in the filler trials: five dyads (42%) chose the 5/0 distribution; three dyads (25%) the 4/1 distribution and four dyads (33%) the 3/2 distribution. Similarly, of the 6-year-old peer dyads, nine dyads (75%) chose the 5/0 distribution and three dyads (25%) the 4/1 distribution.

**Figure 1.** Gemstone distribution in the three experimental trials.

### Do 4- and 6-Year-Old Children Reason Differently With Their Peers Than With Their Mothers?

**Descriptive data.** Four-year-old children produced more justifications in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition (65 vs. 46). Six-year-old children showed the reverse pattern and produced fewer justifications in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition (43 vs. 80). Both age groups produced more spontaneous justifications (4-year-old children: 98% vs. 24%; 6-year-old children: 88% vs. 51%) and more challenges (4-year-old children: 48% vs. 7%; 6-year-old children: 33% vs. 4%) in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition (see Table 1).

Of the 65 justifications 4-year-old children produced in the peer condition, five (8%) referred to the general norm, 55 (85%) to facts, and five (8%) were irrelevant. In the mother–child condition, of the 46 justifications, six (13%) referred to the general norm, 37 (80%) to facts, and three (7%) were irrelevant. Of the 43 justifications 6-year-old children produced in the peer condition, nine (21%) referred to the general norm, and 34 (79%) to facts. In the mother–child condition, of the 80 justifications, five (6%) referred to the general norm, 72 (90%) to facts, and three (4%) were irrelevant (see also Table 2). The peers never referred to alternative endings.

**Statistical analyses.** To investigate the condition effect (or the partner-effect), we ran three analyses using generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with binomial error distribution on a subset of the data, which only included the children’s justifications. We investigated whether there was a condition or age difference in children’s spontaneous justifications (Analysis 1), challenges (Analysis 2), and justification content (Analysis 3). We chose to use GLMM for four reasons: (a) In the peer condition, both children could produce justifications; whereas in the mother–child condition, we focused only on the child. GLMM allowed us to individually include each child regardless of the condition to which they were assigned. Random factors in GLMM allowed us to incorporate the information that the observations of the two children who interacted with one another in the peer condition were not independent. (b) Unlike ANOVAs that require equal observations in each condition, GLMMs can handle data sets in which, for instance, there are twice as many observations in one condition (our peer condition) than the other (our mother–child condition). (c) GLMM allowed us to include the speaker as a random factor such that several justifications by each child could be accounted for. (d) All dyads were observed in three different experimental trials. GLMM allowed us to include story (See-saw, Lego, Blocks) and trial order (1, 2, 3), not only as fixed factors but also as random slopes to account for random variation due to stories and order across dyads.

In Analysis 1, we investigated whether children’s use of spontaneous justifications changed depending on their partner and age. The unit of analysis was each justification. The response variable was whether a justification was spontaneous or not. To test the significance of the full model, we compared its fit with a null model (see Appendix B, Table B1, for the predictors in the models and the results; see also the online supplemental material for the data sets and the R-script used in the statistical analyses). The full model improved the fit, \( \chi^2(3) = 57.30, p < .001. \) The full model revealed a significant interaction of age group and condition, \( \chi^2(1) = 11.43, p < .001. \) To better understand the interaction, we conducted pairwise comparisons. There was a significant condition difference for each age group (4-year-old children: \( \chi^2(1) = 33.20, \)
Children’s Justifications Across Age Groups and Conditions

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<th>Justifications</th>
<th>Spontaneous justifications</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
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$p < .001$; 6-year-old children: $\chi^2(1) = 15.59, p < .001$. Both age groups produced significantly more spontaneous justifications in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition. There was also a significant age difference in the mother–child condition ($\chi^2(1) = 7.15, p = .008$); With their mothers, 6-year-old children produced spontaneous justifications more than 4-year-old children (see Figure 3). There was no age difference in the peer condition (due to the lack of variance in the data we could not conduct a model comparison).

In Analysis 2, we investigated whether children’s use of challenges changed depending on their partner and age. The unit of analysis was each justification (spontaneous and elicited). The response variable was whether a justification was a challenge or not. The full model improved the fit as compared with the null model, $\chi^2(3) = 7.37, p = .061$ (see Appendix B, Table B1, for the predictors in the models and the results). The interaction of age group and condition was not significant, $\chi^2(1) = 0.03, p = .875$, so we dropped the interaction term to get interpretable results for the main effects. The reduced model without the interaction term revealed a significant main effect of condition, $\chi^2(1) = 7.16, p = .008$: Both age groups produced challenges more in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition (see Figure 4).

In Analysis 3, we investigated whether the content of children’s justifications changed depending on their partner and age. The unit of analysis was each justification (spontaneous and elicited). The response variable was whether the justification was a general norm or a fact (we excluded the irrelevant justifications). The full model did not improve the fit, $\chi^2(3) = 5.09, p = .165$ (see Appendix B, Table B1, for the predictors in the models and the results). Thus, there was no age or condition difference in the content of the children’s justifications.

Do Mothers Reason Differently With Their 4- and 6-Year-Old Children?

Descriptive data. With 4-year-old children, all 12 mothers produced a total of 273 justifications. Of these, 225 (82%) referred to facts, 45 (17%) to general norms, three (1%) were irrelevant. With 6-year-old children, all 12 mothers produced a total of 177 justifications. Of these, 120 (68%) referred to facts and 55 (31%) to general norms, two (1%) were irrelevant (see also Table 2). Mothers referred to alternative endings with 4-year-old children in nine out of 36 trials (25%), with 6-year-old children in 20 out of 36 trials (56%).

Statistical analyses. We ran two analyses, using GLMMs with binomial error distribution on a subset of the data that contained only the mothers’ utterances. In Analysis 4, we investigated whether the content of the mothers’ justifications changed depending on the age of the child. The unit of analysis was each justification produced by mothers. The response variable was whether the justification referred to a general norm or a fact (we excluded the irrelevant justifications). When compared with a null model, which only lacked the age of the child, the full model improved the fit, $\chi^2(1) = 5.21, p = .022$ (see Appendix C, Table C1, for a list of all predictors in the models and the results) and revealed a significant main effect of age group: mothers referred to the general norms more often with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children in their justifications (see Figure 5).

In Analysis 5, we investigated whether mothers’ references to alternative endings in their justifications changed depending on the age of the child. The unit of analysis was the dyad. The response variable was a count of the trials in which mothers referred to an alternative ending versus not. We used the cbind function in R with a binomial error structure. The cbind function allows for the analysis of the number of successes (mentioning alternative endings) and failures (not mentioning alternative endings), as opposed to Poisson models, where only the number of successes is counted (Baayen, 2008). When compared with a null model, which only lacked the age of the child, the full model improved the fit, $\chi^2(1) = 4.77, p = .029$ (see Appendix C, Table C1, for the predictors in the models and the results) and revealed a significant main effect of age group: Mothers referred to alternative endings more often with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children (see Figure 6).

Table 2
Justification Content Across Age Groups and Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Justifications</th>
<th>General norms</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Irrelevant justifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mother–child</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6 (13.0%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>45 (16.5%)</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>3 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5 (7.7%)</td>
<td>55 (84.6%)</td>
<td>5 (7.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mother–child</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5 (6.3%)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>55 (31.1%)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>92 (0.9%)</td>
<td>34 (79.1%)</td>
<td>0 (.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of the results. In Analysis 1, we found that children of both age groups produced more spontaneous justifications in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition, with the condition difference being greater for the 4-year-old children than for the 6-year-old children. In Analysis 2, we found that both age groups produced significantly more challenges in the peer condition than in the mother–child condition. In Analysis 3, we found no age or condition difference in the content of children’s justifications. Both age groups used predominantly facts in both conditions. In Analysis 4, we found that mothers referred to the general norms more often with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children. In Analysis 5, we found that mothers referred to an alternative ending more often with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children.

Discussion

Our results suggest that children of both age groups engage in collaborative reasoning differently in their two normative worlds. Overall, children produced more spontaneous justifications with their peers than with their mothers. Moreover, children of both age groups produced more justifications opposing their partners view (challenges) with their peers than with their mothers. Thus, children were more active reasoners with their peers than with their mothers. Unlike in mother–child interactions in which mothers are always more knowledgeable than children, peer interactions, due to their equal footing, provided children a context in which peers could contrast and challenge one another’s different proposals and arguments for resolving a moral dilemma. These results are in line with the findings of Kruger and Tomasello (1986), but the current study is the first to demonstrate this difference at a much younger age, namely in preschool years. It has been assumed that children learn about social norms through interacting with the other members of their culture (Piaget, 1932; Tomasello, 2016). Our study is the first to zoom into the interactions in which moral development takes place by systematically comparing how preschoolers reason about the moral norms with different social partners (mothers vs.
peers) and how they respond to the moral judgments of these different partners.

Moreover, 6-year-old children were more active in their reasoning with their mothers than 4-year-old children, so the effect of the partner (a mother vs. a peer) was more pronounced with 4-year-old children. Younger children might have perceived a greater power asymmetry with their mothers. With the children’s increasing reasoning skills, the asymmetry in mother–child interactions dissolves and children contribute to the interactions more actively. Mothers’ perceptions of their children’s competence in moral reasoning at different ages might have contributed to this as well (see Walker & Taylor, 1991). In fact, our findings suggest that mothers structured the discussions differently with 6-year-old children and 4-year-old children. During the discussions, mothers’ justifications referred more often to the abstract general norms, like, “keeping promises is very important,” with the older than with the younger children. With the 4-year-old children, mothers’ justifications referred mostly to facts from the stories, such as “he kept his promise.” This difference in the mothers’ reason-giving reflects their tendency to focus more on the here-and-now with younger children. Moreover, through repeating the facts, mothers guided young children’s attention and helped them to focus on what is relevant to solve the task.

Mothers were also more likely to propose an alternative ending, such as “he [the helper] could come back to the see-saw after giving Max [the boy on the swings] a push” with 6-year-old children than with 4-year-old children. These alternative endings required counterfactual thinking as they go beyond the dilemma presented in the story and resolve it in a different way. With 6-year-old children, mothers used these rather complex arguments and went beyond the concrete events of the story by proposing alternative outcomes, which indicates again that they adjusted the structure of their justifications to their children’s level of understanding. In addition, because the alternative endings mostly suggested that one character could first help the needy child and then return to the friend to keep the promise, entertaining these alternative endings led mother–child dyads with 6-year-old children to favor the helper in a majority of the trials (see Figure 2). However, the dyads’ overall preferences for the helper did not differ significantly across the age groups or conditions.

The content of children’s justifications was similar in both conditions and in both age groups. They mostly referred to facts in their justifications and focused on the here-and-now (Köymen, Mammen, & Tomasello, 2016; Mammen et al., 2018). In the peer condition, children did not talk about alternative endings. Perhaps children here were too young to talk about counterfactuals on their own, unless they were with an adult (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996). Overall, it was when children were paired with their mothers that the age differences in children’s reasoning become apparent. Thus, the power asymmetry influenced both partners’ behavior: mothers drove the interaction differently with younger than with older children and offered more help based on what they believed was necessary for their child to understand the task. At the same time, younger children became more passive, and let their mothers guide the decision-making process.

Our study had some limitations. First, in our warm-up trials, E ensured that all dyads solved the task the same “correct” way and praised them for solving the tasks correctly (except for the last warm-up trial). This might have primed the dyads to think that there is a correct way of resolving the moral dilemmas in the subsequent experimental trials, even though there was no correct answer. This might have discouraged children from providing justifications for their decisions because they would be worried to give the “wrong” answer. We opted for this approach because in the first five warm-up tasks, one option was clearly better than the other. Accepting any decision and giving neutral feedback would have created a more ambiguous situation: Neutral feedback can be interpreted differently depending on the kind of decision it follows. If some dyads had knowingly made the wrong decision (e.g., choosing a lollipop to feed a cat, instead of fish), then neutral feedback might have been interpreted as “whatever we decide is fine.” If some dyads had made the right decision, then the neutral feedback might have been interpreted as “we need to find the right choice”. As a result, dyads would have been primed to do different things in the subsequent experimental trials. Instead, the warm-up trials were completed the same way across all four groups, so we believe that the kind of warm-up activities that we used is unlikely to have a significant impact in our results.

A second concern could be the complexity of the stories, especially for the 4-year-old children. Yet, previous studies with similar stimuli have shown that 3-year-old children comprehend stories about moral transgressions (e.g., Mammen et al., 2018). In our study, the dyads could consult the picture books while they made their decisions, so the memory demands were reduced. Moreover, 4-year-old children produced justifications during peer conversations as often as 6-year-old children did. Thus, we believe that the difficulty to recall the stories was unlikely to have an effect on our results. Finally, one could argue that the complexity of the stories varied such that some stories required better perspective-taking skills or theory of mind competence than others. However, we did not find any effect of story on any of our measures. Nonetheless, having an additional measure of theory of mind competence (e.g., false belief tasks) could have explained how theory of mind understanding affects moral reasoning.

In the present study, we observed children in two contexts: Mother–child interactions with power asymmetry and peer interactions with no power asymmetry. The power dynamics within these two contexts, however, do change as children get older (Smetana, 1999). Mother–child interactions become more symmetrical (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994) and peer interactions might become more asymmetrical (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2008). Thus, although our study is a first and important step toward understanding the role of parents and peers in preschoolers’ moral reasoning, future research should investigate how mothers and peers impact children’s moral development in different ages and different cultures, focusing more on the power dynamics in each sociocultural context.

To conclude, as early as age 4, children reason differently in their two normative worlds. We have shown that the partner they are reasoning with significantly influences the way children navigate their social interactions. They are more active with their peers, recognizing the similarities in their knowledge, authority, and experience. They are more passive with their mothers, recognizing the differences in knowledge, authority, and experience. Thus, peer interactions offer children a unique environment that facilitates moral reasoning.
References


(Appendices follow)
Appendix A

Material

The Picture Books and Narratives

Experimental Trials

1.1. This is [Child A] and this is [Child B]. They are 4/6 years old. Here they are playing with building blocks together. Those are their favorite blocks.

1.2. They want to continue playing with them later, so they hide the blocks. They promise each other not to tell anyone where the blocks are hidden. [Child A] says, “I won’t tell anybody where the blocks are hidden, I promise.” [Child B] says, “I won’t tell anybody where the blocks are hidden, either, I promise.”

1.3. This is [Child C]. She/he is building a block tower. [Child C] has played by herself/himself all day. Now she/he wants the tower to go higher. [Child C] is looking for someone who has a few blocks and wants to play with her/him.

1.4. [Child A] does not tell [Child C] where the blocks are. [Child A] does not tell the secret, like she promised. Now [Child C] is sad.

1.5. [Child B] tells [Child C] where the blocks are hidden. [Child B] breaks the promise and has now told the secret. Now [Child A] is sad.

2.1. These are [Child A] and [Child B]. They are both 4/6 years old. They both like playing on the see-saw.

2.2. [Child A] and [Child B] promise each other to stay on the see-saw until lunch. [Child A] says, “I’ll play on the see-saw with you until lunch, I promise.” [Child B] says, “I’ll play with you on the see-saw until lunch, too, I promise.”

2.3. This is [Child C]. She/he likes the swings. She/he is not good at it, so she/he asks the others to give her/him a push.

2.4. [Child A] cannot push her. She/he keeps the promise to play on the see-saw with [Child B]. Now [Child C] is sad.

2.5. [Child B] pushes [Child C]. Now she/he cannot play with [Child A] on the see-saw, even though she promised. Now [Child A] is sad.

(Appendices continue)
Appendix A (continued)

3.1. These are [Child A] and [Child B], they are 4/6 years old. They are playing with Lego blocks and build a house. Only the roof is missing.

3.2. It is snack time now. They promise each other to finish the roof afterwards. [Child A] says, “I’ll come back to finish the roof with you after the snacks, I promise.” [Child B] says, “I’ll come back to finish the house with you after the snacks, too, I promise.”

3.3. This is [child C]. She/He found several boxes in the yard. She wants to bring them upstairs to play with them. The boxes are quite heavy.

3.4. [Child A] cannot help [Child C]. [Child A] has promised to finish the roof with [Child B]. Now [Child C] is sad.

3.5. [Child B] helps [Child C] carrying the boxes. Now she/he cannot finish the roof with [Child A], even though she/he has promised to do so. Now [Child A] is sad.

Filler Trial

1. This is [Child C]. He/she has two stuffed toys.

2. This is [Child A], and this is [Child B]. They are both 4/6 years old. [Child C] gives each of them one of her/his toys to play with for a little while.

3. They both really like [Child C]’s stuffed toys. [Child A] says, “I really like the stuffed toys.” [Child B] says, “I really like the stuffed toys, too.”

4. Now they are finished playing, and [Child A] returns the stuffed toy to [Child C] because it belongs to [Child C].

5. [Child B] does not give back the stuffed toy. She/he wants to keep it, even though she/he knows that it belongs to [Child C]. Now [Child C] is sad.

(Appendices continue)
Appendix B

Set 1 Analyses: Do 4- and 6-Year-Old Children Reason Differently With Their Peers and With Their Mothers?

Table B1  
Generalized Linear Mixed Models: Binomial Error Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Response variable</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spontaneous justification vs. not</td>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Full–null</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;.001***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Age group × Condition</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Trial order</td>
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<td>Story</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Challenge vs. not</td>
<td>Justification</td>
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<td>7.371</td>
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<td>.061</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Age group × Condition</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.875</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Age group*</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.660</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Condition*</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender*</td>
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<td>.954</td>
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<td>Trial order*</td>
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<td>Story*</td>
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<td>.607</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>General norms vs. facts</td>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Full–null</td>
<td>5.095</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Full model: response variable = age group × condition + gender + trial order + story + (1 + trial order.2 + trial order.3 + story.2 + story.3 ldyad) + (1|lspeaker). Null model: response variable = gender + trial order + story + (1 + trial order.2 + trial order.3 + story.2 + story.3 ldyad) + (1|lspeaker). Levels of the factors: age group: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds; condition: peer condition, mother–child condition; gender: male, female; trial order: experimental trial 1, 2, 3; story: see saw, lego, blocks. Factors trial order & story were dummy coded and centered for the random slopes.

a The values come from the reduced model that lacks the interaction term age group × condition.

**Appendix C**

Set 2 Analyses: Do Mothers Reason Differently With Their 4- and 6-Year-Old Children?

Table C1  
Generalized Linear Mixed Models: Binomial Error Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Response variable</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>General norms vs. facts</td>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Full–null/age group</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.022*</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>.795</td>
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<td>Trial order</td>
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<td>.358</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Story</td>
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<td>.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>cbind (number of trials with alternative ending, number of trials without alternative ending)</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>Full–null/age group</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.029*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.878</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Note.* Analysis 4: Full model: response variable = age group + gender + trial order + story + (1 + trial order.2 + trial order.3 + story.2 + story.3 lspeaker). Null model: response variable = gender + trial order + story + (1 + trial order.2 + trial order.3 + story.2 + story.3 lspeaker). Analysis 5: Full model: age group + gender + (1|speaker.ID). Null model: gender + (1|speaker.ID). Levels of the factors: age group: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds; gender: male, female; trial order: experimental trial 1, 2, 3; story: see saw, lego, blocks Factors trial order & story were dummy coded and centered for the random slopes.

*p < .05.